The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters by Furrow, Barry R.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 50 
Number 1 (Fall 2005) Article 9 
2005 
The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (Or Is It Three or 
Four?) Masters 
Barry R. Furrow 
Health Law Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol50/iss1/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
165 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SPORTS DOCTOR: SERVING TWO (OR IS 
IT THREE OR FOUR?) MASTERS 
BARRY R. FURROW* 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans love sports.  We spend millions of dollars on stadiums, gift 
items from team franchises, luxury box seats, and thousands of hours watching 
sporting events on television and at these stadiums.  In 2002, it was estimated 
that the combined value of the teams in the NBA, NHL, MLB, and NFL was 
more than $12 billion.1  Sports is the new mass entertainment industry, as 
media giants generate more and more sports programming.  The velocity of 
money moving around in professional sports has increased dramatically.  For 
example, the average salary of a major league baseball player climbed from 
approximately $76,000 in 1977 to $2,385,000 in 2002.2  Up to forty hours per 
week “professional team sports are beamed to home television sets by the 
major networks,” and hundreds of hours more by cable networks.3  Sports is 
big business. 
Athletes are our American heroes, subject to obsessive fan worship and 
idealization as manifestations of the Greek ideal of the perfect citizen.  We 
drive our children to higher and higher levels of performance excellence as 
part of proving that we are competitive parents.  When I was growing up in the 
Midwest in the fifties and early sixties, we played random pickup games of 
baseball and basketball in elementary school.  By middle school and high 
school, team sports were a major feature of any good public school.  We 
adored Iowa basketball, driving long distances to see our men’s and women’s 
teams play in state tournaments.  Sports were accessible to everyone, a 
commonality that could easily be shared among very different individuals.  
And intensity certainly surrounded sport competition, even forty years ago. 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, the Health Law Institute, Widener University School of Law.  
B.A., Harvard College, J.D., Harvard Law School. 
 1. Soonhwan Lee & Hyosung Chun, Economic Values of Professional Sport Franchises in 
the United States, 5 SPORT J. (Fall 2002), http://www.thesportjournal.org/2002Journal/Vol5-
No3/econimic-values.asp. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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The development of sports as big business, however, has taken this 
intensity and magnified it.  Sports today is marked by characteristics that are 
more intensely visible than in the past.  First, sports is big business, drawing in 
millions of commercial sponsorships and paying out millions in high salaries to 
star athletes in professional sports.  Second, sports competition is fueled by 
American competitiveness, enhanced by pressures from the media and 
corporate sponsorships.  Third, sports operates at times as a metaphor for life 
as warfare.  And finally, from the perspective of this Article, sports can be 
quite dangerous, causing injuries to players and also subjecting them to 
stresses that may exacerbate existing injuries.  The result is often intense 
pressure on athletes, coaches, and on team physicians.  Former National 
Football League player Bernie Parrish has said: 
The doctor is a super-fan who is part of the team.  His decisions are greatly 
influenced by the need of the team and the desire of the patient to play.  “Let 
him play and we’ll keep a close watch on him” is too often the decision of the 
super-fan physician.4 
Consider the intensity manifested by Curt Schilling’s desire to pitch in the 
World Series in 2004, and the parallel desire of the team physician Bill 
Morgan to enable him to do so.  Morgan developed an innovative technique of 
stitching down Schilling’s damaged ankle tendon.5  The tendon was sutured 
temporarily into place by stitching the skin to the deep tissue below it.6  It was 
a temporary solution, with Dr. Morgan assuring Schilling that it would not 
damage Schilling’s ankle any further.7  Schilling was delighted to continue to 
pitch, although it is certainly not clear that the risk of harm was zero.  The 
physician demonstrated his intense commitment to do whatever it would take 
to keep a critical player in competition.  Was this innovation without long term 
risks to Schilling?  If the information was lacking, should the procedure have 
been done?  Clearly, the interests of team physician, player, and team were in 
alignment, but against the standards of good prudent medical practice. 
I.  GOOD MEDICINE: THE IDEAL PHYSICIAN 
An analysis of the proper functions of a sports doctor and the possible 
conflicts that he or she might encounter depends on a baseline standard of ideal 
physician conduct.  The analysis traditionally starts with the role of physician 
as fiduciary to the patient. 
 
 4. Craig A. Isaacs, Comment, Conflicts of Interest for Team Physicians: A Retrospective in 
Light of Gathers v. Loyola Marymount University, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 147, 159 (1992). 
 5. Steve Wilstein, Schilling Placed Pennant Over Pain, ESPN.COM, Oct. 23, 2004, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs2004/news/story?id=1907879. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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A. The Physician as Fiduciary 
We use the language of fiduciary law in special circumstances to define the 
obligations that one person owes to another.  A fiduciary obligation in 
medicine means that the physician focuses exclusively on the patient’s health; 
the patient assumes the doctor’s single-minded devotion to him; and the 
doctor–patient relationship is expected to be free of conflict.  Medical ethicists 
frequently speak of the doctor’s special duties in relation to the patient, often 
characterizing the doctor as a special friend to the patient, connected by a bond 
of loyalty normally subsumed within the meaning of friendship.  It is a strong 
agency relationship in which we trust the physician as our agent to look out for 
our best interests.  Hans Jonas describes this duty owed by the physician to a 
patient as a “sacred trust,” an intense obligation to ignore social and other 
concerns that interfere with the care of the specific patient.8 
The ethical literature often intensifies this agency relationship, turning the 
“special friend” into a “warrior” on the patient’s behalf—fiercely devoted, 
drawing upon all available resources to combat the war against the enemy—
illness.9  While this agency model may suffer from severe limitations in the 
doctor–patient setting, it is clearly a correct description of the legal and cultural 
view of the doctor–patient relationship.10  Physicians have always been bound 
by fiduciary obligations, and for good reason, as the doctor–patient 
relationship has always been laden with conflicts of interest.11 
Lacking equality in the relationship, the patient is, in Judge Spottswood 
Robinson’s phrase, “well nigh abject” in his ignorance of medicine and 
 
 8. HANS JONAS, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FROM ANCIENT CREED TO TECHNOLOGICAL 
MAN 124 (1974). 
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the patient and no one else.  He is 
not the agent of society, nor of the interests of medical science, nor of the patient’s family, 
nor of his co-sufferers, or future sufferers from the same disease.  The patient alone 
counts when he is under the physician’s care. . . .  [T]he physician is bound not to let any 
other interest interfere with that of the patient in being cured.  But, manifestly, more 
sublime norms than contractual ones are involved.  We may speak of a sacred trust; 
strictly by its terms, the doctor is, as it were, alone with his patient and God. 
Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See David Dranove & William D. White, Agency and the Organization of Health Care 
Delivery, 24 INQUIRY 405 (1987). 
 11. A physician may be said to act as an agent for the patient in selecting appropriate 
specialists, hospitals, and other care providers.  Under traditional agency law, the physician is 
therefore a fiduciary for these purposes.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).  
The general principle of loyalty owed by a fiduciary agent to a principal is described in the 
following terms: “Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act 
solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency.”  Id. § 387; see 
also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients 
and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 366–67 (1990) (discussing the 
patient-centered decision-making obligation in terms of fiduciary duty). 
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uncertainty about treatment.12  The law, acknowledging this inequality, and not 
completely trusting physician ethics and objectivity, has created frameworks to 
equalize the relationship and empower the patient.  The doctrine of informed 
consent requires that information be disclosed and that the patient consent to 
diagnoses and treatment.  Disclosure obligations stretch beyond informed 
consent to include disclosure of possible economic conflicts of interest, and 
even in rare cases personal shortcomings of the physician independent of 
treatment risks, such as alcoholism or inexperience.  And standing in the 
shadows, brooding in anticipation of failures that cause patient harm, are 
malpractice litigation, medical licensing boards, and hospital staff review. 
We don’t, in other words, completely trust our doctors.  Why not?  They 
are well and expensively trained, having given up close to a decade or more of 
their productive years in demanding medical study; they are professionals, 
socialized into high ethical standards, and are paid to look after the patients’ 
best interests.  We do not trust them without reserve because of situational 
pressures that may at times corrupt or at least tempt them: doctors work for 
economic and other gains, as we all do.  They are weak at times, prey to needs 
and pressures not aligned with those of their patients, and they are under 
tremendous pressures in contexts like that of competitive sports, and 
particularly professional sports. 
Why should a team doctor, a sport doctor, be any more able than the 
ordinary physician to avoid conflicts of interest?  The sports doctor is in a 
conflict of interest situation from the moment he or she contracts to serve a 
sports team, whether a private team or a university collegiate sports system.  
Like the company doctor and the military doctor, the team doctor wants to 
serve his patient=s best interests and also his employer=s best interests.  He or 
she is under substantial pressure, more pressure than the average family 
practitioner experiences with the average patient.  The pressure is to ensure 
that the player heals well and fast, to sign off on a player’s injury or an 
underlying cardiac condition so that the player can return to team play. 
The doctor has never been an unalloyed agent for the patient, to be trusted 
without reservation. The physician has always had mixed motivations—to 
maximize income, to fit within normal practice rather than be a leader, and to 
get along.  In this atmosphere, where the physician has ceased to be a trusted 
agent bound to protect the patient’s interests at all costs, both physician and 
patient need a protective legal framework to push back against other pressures 
they both may feel. 
Professional ethics impose fiduciary obligations on physicians, which 
courts convert into legal obligations.  Courts often look outside the parameters 
of contract law analysis in judging the obligations of a physician to treat a 
patient, stressing that the physician’s obligation to his patient, while having its 
 
 12. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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origins in contract, is governed also by fiduciary obligations and other public 
considerations “inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling.”13  
Doctors are not treated like businesspeople, where self-interest is expected to 
be the norm.14   
Physicians lose a range of legal protections when they withhold 
information from patients.  Withholding information about a medical error by 
the doctor is fraud in some states, a distinct cause of action.15  It also tolls the 
 
 13. Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (doctor withdrew from care 
at time when wife was in premature labor; while husband searched for a substitute, wife delivered 
child); see Chatman v. Millis, 517 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Ark. 1975) (holding that malpractice action 
requires a doctor–patient relationship, i.e., there must be a duty owed from doctor to patient, 
although commenting that “[w]e do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must be predicated 
upon a contractual agreement between a doctor . . . and patient”).  For a history of this fiduciary 
duty, see generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s 
Fiduciary Role in Maternal–Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 456–69 (2000). 
 14. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 949 (1963). 
It is clear from everyday observation that the behavior expected of sellers of medical care 
is different from that of business men in general.  These expectations are relevant because 
medical care belongs to the category of commodities for which the product and the 
activity of production are identical.  In all such cases, the customer cannot test the product 
before consuming it, and there is an element of trust in the relation.  But the ethically 
understood restrictions on the activity of a physician are much more severe than on those 
of, say, a barber.  His behavior is supposed to be governed by a concern for the 
customer’s welfare which would not be expected of a salesman.  In Talcott Parsons’s 
terms, there is a “collectivity-orientation,” which distinguishes medicine and other 
professions from business, where self-interest on the part of participants is the accepted 
norm. 
Id.; see also TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34–49 (rev. ed. 1954). 
 15. In a few jurisdictions, courts have allowed a separate intentional tort theory to be pleaded 
along with a negligence claim, where the physician has deliberately altered records to create 
misleading entries or has knowingly made a false material representation to a plaintiff.  The party 
seeking to take advantage of a defendant’s fraudulent concealment has the burden of proving that 
the defendant affirmatively concealed the facts upon which the cause of action is based.  As one 
court noted, however, “The close relationship of trust and confidence between patient and 
physician gives rise to duties of disclosure which may obviate the need for a patient to prove an 
affirmative act of concealment.”  Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Iowa 1986). 
  An action for deceit requires proof that a false representation of a material fact was 
made, the false representation was relied upon by the patient in ignorance, and damage resulted.  
See Harris v. Penninger, 613 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).  The representation must be 
fraudulently made, because an intention to deceive by the physician is needed.  Id.  In Hart v. 
Browne, 163 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), a physician was sued for fraud when 
he advised the lawyer for a surgeon’s patient that the surgeon’s conduct was not negligent, when 
the records he had examined in fact showed abundant negligence.  See also Henry v. Deen, 310 
S.E.2d 326, 328 (N.C. 1984) (allowing a theory of civil conspiracy and a punitive damages 
claim); Krueger v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, 305 N.W.2d 18, 25 (N.D. 1981) (allowing a claim of 
fraud based upon the physician’s false representations). 
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statute of limitations in a malpractice suit by the patient against that doctor.16  
An informed consent cause of action is based on failure to disclose 
information.17  Some newer cases are also based on a claim for a breach of a 
physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose conflicts of interest.18  In Mark Pauly’s 
words, “[T]he market for medical care is almost as much a market for 
information as it is a market for specific services.”19  Athletes are particularly 
vulnerable consumers, poorly equipped to decide whether a medical service is 
critical, deferrable, or unnecessary.  Nor can they decide whether the 
physician’s treatment recommendations are generally accepted practice, 
something innovative, or simply a minority practice. 
B. The Special Role of the Team Physician 
The sports medicine physician has a more active and involved relationship 
with sports team members than your or my primary care physician typically 
has with us.20  He or she must make major decisions about an athlete’s health, 
qualifications to join a team, and ability to participate safely.21  These 
decisions have the potential to affect the success of the athlete and the success 
of the team, and are often made under intense time pressure.22 
The sports physician must understand the unique risk of each sport and 
possess an extensive medical knowledge of the musculoskeletal system, the 
cardio-respiratory function, neurology, psychology and behavior, 
pharmacology, and exercise science.  Practice areas include family practice, 
orthopedic surgery, internal medicine, pediatrics, emergency medicine, general 
surgery, and cardiology.23 
Sports medicine is special because of the intensity of play, and therefore 
the possible severity of injuries.  The possibility of severe injuries, coupled 
with pressures to keep athletes in play, defines the team physician’s role as a 
special one, subject to unique and intense pressures. 
 
 16. See, e.g., Mastro v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Colo. 1984) (defining “discovery” for 
purposes of tolling statute of limitations). 
 17. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 366–67 
(5th ed. 2004). 
 18. Professor Calandrillo argues that physicians must be required to disclose their conflicts 
of interest to the athlete–patients they treat.  See Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: 
Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 206–07 (2005). 
 19. Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 227, 228 (1988). 
 20. See Justin P. Caldarone, Professional Team Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethical 
Dilemmas, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 131, 145 (2002). 
 21. See id. at 142. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Twila Keim, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health Care Under the Pressure 
of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 196, 198 (1999). 
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II.  THE CONFLICTED REALITY OF SPORTS MEDICINE 
Multiple sources of pressure impinge on physician decision-making.  
Players in professional sports are now getting million-dollar-plus contracts and 
lucrative endorsements for consumer goods.  Owners are making handsome 
profits from at least some of the sports franchises.  Coaches are also celebrities 
with salaries to match.  The sports doctor, often an intense sports fan, gets 
employment with teams and direct involvement in the sport.  And if the 
physician is part of a medical group, the group gets tremendously valuable free 
advertising that will draw in other patients. 
Medical groups often bid for team doctor status.24  The NFL’s Jacksonville 
Jaguars, for example, advertised for the position of team physician; the 
winning doctor was “expected to purchase luxury boxes, pay for 
advertisements in game programs, and donate [medical] supplies.”25  A 
medical practice, therefore, sees sports medicine as a marketing device for 
drawing in other patients26 and is likely to want to maintain team doctor status 
at any cost given its revenue generation potential. 
The athletes themselves are under powerful pressures to compete well, in 
order to continue a lucrative career and keep younger athletes from overtaking 
them.27  The team wants to win and wants each team member to be physically 
able to compete at optimal levels.  An injured player, if unable to play, risks 
the delicate balance that often constitutes an effective team dynamic.  The 
coach in any sport is fiercely competitive and often marked by the ethic of 
playing in spite of injuries as the appropriate response; his career, high income, 
and future employment with other teams depends on each player continuing to 
play. 
The owner likewise has invested millions of dollars in his franchise in the 
expectation of success and the glory and perhaps profit that attend success.  
And the player’s family may in some cases also be dependent on the largess of 
the player and want him to continue playing in order to keep up the revenue 
stream of professional athletics.  The pressures on players to play at any cost—
and therefore on their doctors to keep them in play—require strong counter 
pressures in order to protect both players and physicians from conduct that 
causes long-term patient injury. 
 
 24. Caldarone, supra note 20, at 145. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Some of these pressures are well described in Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No 
Compensation: Exploiting Professional Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care 
Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 507, 515–18 (2001). 
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III.  STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE HIGH QUALITY CARE IN SPORTS MEDICINE 
Just as sports has become big business, sports medicine is in the process of 
becoming a medical subspecialty.28  And sports law is also becoming an 
elective subject of study in American law schools, as scholars turn their 
attention to the legal issues surrounding sports.29  The coalescence of sports 
medicine into a distinct specialty with strong guidelines for good medical 
practice and ethical boundaries is a salutary development, as it creates a 
bargaining force to shield team physicians from some of the pressures that may 
corrupt their judgment in treating the individual player as a patient whose 
interests are central to the physician. 
Four general duties govern sports medicine, and they are summed up by 
the acronym POPE.30  I use the acronym POPE to capture the seriousness of 
the task of helping sports doctors minimize their conflicts of interest.  It is a 
collection of possible strategies that, taken together, reduce the risks of sports 
medicine conflicts for both player and doctor.  These duties are to: 
Protect athletes from injury, re-injury, or permanent disability, placing their 
welfare over that of the team or other competing interests; 
Offer candid and full disclosure as to the nature and extent of injuries and the 
consequences of returning to play; 
Practice good medicine, as defined by practice guidelines and consensus 
statements; and 
Enable players to avoid unnecessary risks, both by helping them understand 
what proper treatment is and what risks are presented by returning to play, and 
by sharpening the framework for a declaration of ineligibility to play under 
some circumstances, removing the choice from the player as well as the team 
and coach. 
A. Protect Athletes from Injury, Re-injury, or Permanent Disability, Placing 
Their Welfare Over That of the Team or Other Competing Interests 
The physician is typically employed by the team or franchise, which places 
him or her in a position to receive a great deal of pressure from team 
management, ownership, and coaches.31  Because of this, the physician is often 
 
 28. See id. at 513; Keim, supra note 23, at 198–99. 
 29. Some recent writing includes Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports 
Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary, and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 5 (2002); Caldarone, supra 
note 20; DiCello, supra note 27; Isaacs, supra note 4.  This Saint Louis University Law Journal 
symposium is the most recent example of the maturing of sports law as an academic specialty. 
 30. POPE is unrelated to the Hail Mary play in football, an offensive play where the 
quarterback throws the ball up in the air without really targeting any particular receiver, hoping 
someone on his team catches it. 
 31. Keim, supra note 23, at 212. 
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faced with an ethical, as well as legal, dilemma when the medical interest of 
his or her athlete–patient does not coincide with the interests of the team.32  
“The primary responsibility of the team physician is to protect the athlete’s 
health and well-being[;]”33 however, competitive pressures may tempt the 
physician to “focus only on the individual athlete’s capacity to perform.”34 
A team physician is a specialist aware of “fundamentals that all practicing 
specialists in sports medicine should know, based on the types of athletes” with 
whom the physician is involved.35  He offers “special competence in sports 
medicine” and must conform to the “standard of care corresponding to . . . 
actual specialty training.”36  He is first and foremost a physician, bound to both 
ethical standards of conduct and medical standards of practice. 
The standard of sports medicine care has often been hard to establish.  For 
example, in Zimbauer v. Milwaukee Orthopaedic Group, Ltd.,37 a pitcher for 
the Milwaukee Brewers sued the team’s doctor, club, and medical clinic for 
negligent misdiagnosis and treatment.38  He had a complex shoulder injury, 
experiencing substantial pain and undergoing arthroscopic surgery and 
capsular shift repair.39  He was then diagnosed with a possible torn rotator 
cuff.40  The court noted that his “occupation as a pitcher invoked particular 
concerns that fall within the specialized realm of sports medicine: the 
appropriate level of pain [he] could expect to experience and physical therapy 
tailored to his profession as a major league pitcher.”41  The plaintiff’s experts 
simply failed to show an appropriate sports medicine standard of care or 
breach.42 
Other cases, however, have demonstrated judicial comfort with evaluating 
medical standards in light of the particular risks of sports.  Some sports are 
more dangerous than others.  Boxing, football, and even skiing rank high on 
the list of sports that inflict long-term damage to competitors, often devastating 
damage or death.  In Rosensweig v. State,43 the court found as a matter of law 
that the physician had complied with the applicable standard of care by 
conducting a standard examination which failed to reveal a prior brain injury, 
noting that the boxer’s medical history failed to show any symptoms of 
 
 32. Id. at 212–13. 
 33. Id. at 214. 
 34. Id. at 213. 
 35. Id. at 202 (internal quotation omitted). 
 36. Keim, supra note 23, at 202. 
 37. 920 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
 38. Id. at 962. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 965. 
 42. Zimbauer, 920 F. Supp. at 965. 
 43. 171 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958). 
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concussion or brain injury.44  Some expert physicians had testified that the 
boxer should not have been medically cleared because he had been knocked 
out in a prior fight, but the court characterized the examining physician’s 
clearance recommendation as an honest error of judgment.45  Nonetheless, it 
was an error, and the next case is unlikely to be described as an “honest” one, 
thereby raising the bar for future cases of boxer evaluations prior to a match.  
In Classen v. Izquierdo,46 by contrast, the New York Supreme Court ruled that 
a ringside physician’s refusal to stop a boxing match in which a participant 
received several blows to the head and died from his injuries might be 
malpractice.47  The court noted that a physician has a duty to conform to “good 
and accepted standards of medical care” in determining whether an athlete 
should continue participating in a sport.48  A third example is Mikkelsen v. 
Haslam,49 where the plaintiff successfully alleged that a physician negligently 
provided her with medical clearance to snow ski after hip replacement 
surgery.50  The jury found the physician negligent based on undisputed 
testimony that advising a total hip replacement patient that skiing is 
permissible “is a departure from orthopedic medical profession standards.”51 
Sports medicine is becoming a recognized specialty, with more medical 
boards now offering board certification in sports medicine.52  While older case 
law did not recognize sports medicine, that is clearly changing.53  Some of the 
Consensus Statements regarding good practice are strongly phrased and allow 
 
 44. Id. at 914. 
 45. Id. at 913–14. 
 46. 520 N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
 47. Id. at 999, 1002. 
 48. Id. at 1002. 
 49. 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
 50. Id. at 1385–86. 
 51. Id. at 1386. 
 52. See Get the Facts: Orthopaedic Sports Medicine Subspecialty Certification, SPORTS 
MED. UPDATE (Am. Orthopaedic Soc. for Sports Med., Rosemont, Ill.), May–Jun. 2003, at 8, 
available at http://www.sportsmed.org/secure/reveal/admin/uploads/documents/SMU2003May 
Jun.pdf (reporting that the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery now offers board certification 
in sports medicine). 
On March 20, 2003, the American Board of Medical Specialties approved subspecialty 
certification in orthopaedic sports medicine, which will be administered by the American 
Board of Orthopaedic Surgery (ABOS).  AOSSM applauds the decision as a critical step 
forward that will ultimately elevate the level of postgraduate education specific to the 
field. . . . [T]he ABOS-proposed list of criteria for certification can be found on the 
Society website, www.sportsmed.org. 
Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Fleischmann v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 So.2d 216, 217 (La. Ct. App. 1985) 
(noting that sports medicine is not a recognized medical subspecialty). 
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a physician to invoke them as a shield to deflect the strong pressures directed 
at his decisions.54 
B. Offer Candid and Full Disclosure As to the Nature and Extent of Injuries 
and the Consequences of Returning to Play 
Players may understand clearly the risks of re-injury or further damage if 
they play with existing injuries.  At times the physician in that situation may 
lack the power to remove the player from play.  But more often we fear that 
team physicians, totally invested in the team’s success (and their continued 
employment), may hold back critical risk information from patients.55 
The case of Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners56 provides one of the 
best articulated duties imposed judicially on team doctors in this situation.  
Charlie Krueger filed a complaint against his former employer, the San 
Francisco Forty Niners, for fraudulent concealment of medical information.57  
Krueger asserted in his claim that neither the adverse effects of steroid 
injections or the true nature and extent of the damage to his knee were 
disclosed to him.58  He sued for fraud or deceit under California Civil Code 
Sections 1709 and 1710.59  “Section 1709 provides that ‘[o]ne who willfully 
deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or 
risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.’”60  Section 1710(3) 
“defines deceit as ‘[t]he suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose 
it or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want 
of communication of that fact.’”61 
Fraud or deceit requires proof that there was “a misrepresentation or 
suppression of a material fact; knowledge of any falsity; intent to induce 
 
 54. See, e.g., Team Physician Consensus Statement, http://www.sportsmed.org/secure/ 
reveal/admin/uploads/documents/CS_TeamPhysician.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
The principal responsibility of the team physician is to provide for the well-being of 
individual athletes—enabling each to realize his/her full potential.  The team physician 
should possess special proficiency in the care of musculoskeletal injuries and medical 
conditions encountered in sports.  The team physician also must actively integrate medical 
expertise with other healthcare providers, including medical specialists, athletic trainers, 
and allied health professionals.  The team physician must ultimately assume responsibility 
within the team structure for making medical decisions that affect the athlete’s safe 
participation. 
Id. 
 55. See Caldarone, supra note 20, at 146. 
 56. 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 57. Id. at 580. 
 58. Id. at 581. 
 59. Id. at 582. 
 60. Id. (quoting CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1709 (1987)). 
 61. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (quoting CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1710(3)). 
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reliance; actual and justifiable reliance; and resulting damages.”62  Section 
1710 mandates that the concealment is not fraud unless there is a fiduciary 
relationship.63  The court in Krueger noted that “[t]he relationship between 
physician and patient is fiduciary in nature and creates a duty to disclose.”64  It 
found that the team physicians failed to tell Krueger about possible adverse 
effects of steroid injections, the nature and extent of his left knee damage, and 
the extent of damage revealed by x-rays of his left knee.65  “[H]e thereafter 
developed calcification in the knee and suffered greater pain than had been the 
case before the surgery.”66  He continued playing with pain and medical 
treatment until he retired.67  He then began to have chronic trouble with the 
knee.  He ended up suffering from “traumatic arthritis and a crippling 
degenerative process in the left knee,” unable to stand up for prolonged periods 
or to run or walk on stairs without severe pain.68  “His condition [was] 
degenerative and irreversible.”69 
Krueger had asked to see his medical records and then learned that his 
physicians had known for many years that playing football would make his 
knee worse or permanently damage it.70  He also thought that some treatments 
for his knee had never been recorded in his medical chart.71  And he was never 
told that he should stop playing or even that playing would aggravate the 
condition.72 
The Court of Appeals indicated that the critical question was not whether 
the team physicians withheld information from Krueger, but instead “whether 
full disclosure of his medical condition was ever made to Krueger.”73  The 
court stated that a “physician cannot avoid responsibility for failure to make 
full disclosure by simply claiming that information was not withheld.”74  While 
the defendants produced testimony that the physicians treating Krueger told 
him of the general nature of his injury and did not conceal certain information 
from him, there was no evidence that Krueger was informed of the continuing 
risks associated with his injuries.75 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 582–83. 
 64. Id. at 583. 
 65. Id. at 582–83. 
 66. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 582. 
 67. Id. at 581. 
 68. Id. at 582. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 581–82. 
 71. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 583. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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The court held that the physician wanted to keep Krueger in play, and 
“consciously failed to make full, meaningful disclosure to him respecting the 
magnitude of the risk he took in continuing to play a violent contact sport with 
a profoundly damaged knee.”76  The court found that the physician’s “claim of 
no concealment cannot be substituted for the professional warnings to which 
Krueger was . . . so clearly entitled.”77  It was in the blatant failure to disclose, 
viewed in the light of the team’s obvious and compelling interest in prolonging 
Krueger’s career, that the court found “the intent requisite for a finding of 
fraudulent concealment.”78 
The court found that patients are “entitled to rely upon physicians for full 
disclosure of material medical information.”79  The team physician contended 
that Krueger “was or should have been cognizant of the seriousness and 
permanent nature of the injury to his left knee,” and therefore Krueger made 
his own decision to keep playing.80  However, the court held that Krueger was 
entitled to rely upon the physicians for medical treatment and advice regarding 
his decision to play without consulting outside sources or undertaking 
independent investigation.81 
Informed consent and the duty to disclose are closely related.  The 
American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 8.08 on 
Informed Consent, states: “The patient’s right of self-decision can be 
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable 
an intelligent choice.”82  A physician has a duty to disclose the treatment 
options available to a patient and the associated risks and benefits.83  This full 
disclosure may be shortchanged, however, given the team doctor’s conflicted 
obligations to the player and the team. 
The Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 10.03 on the Patient–Physician 
Relationship in the Context of Work-Related and Independent Medical 
Examinations addresses the patient–physician relationship under a similar 
conflict-of-interest situation in which a physician is employed by the company 
that requires a medical examination of a person.84  The situation is analogous 
to that of the team physician; in both, the patient–physician relationship is 
atypical because the person receiving the treatment is distinct from the person 
 
 76. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
 82. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS, § 8.08 (2004–2005), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n= 
resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-8.08.HTM&s_t=informed+nth=4&. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 10.03. 
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or entity who requests and pays for the services—i.e., the person’s employer or 
prospective employer.  Opinion 10.03 states that the physician employed by 
the company “has a responsibility to inform the patient about important health 
information or abnormalities that he or she discovers during the course of the 
examination.”85  Additionally, “the physician should ensure to the extent 
possible that the patient understands the problem or diagnosis.”86  This 
Opinion affirms that, when faced with a conflict of interest such as this, the 
physician must satisfy the obligations of the patient–physician relationship, 
including being an advocate for the patient.87 
Krueger and the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics mandate that a team 
doctor must “honestly inform the athlete as to his or her true medical 
condition, and take affirmative steps to ensure that the athlete understands the 
potential consequences of playing with a particular medical condition.”88  A 
sports player is entitled to rely on the physician’s advice without concern that 
the physician is placing the team’s interest above patient care.89  The team 
doctor may be the only doctor a player ever sees about an injury and he must 
be able to trust the physician to properly treat the injury and to provide honest 
and complete information about the player’s long term health prospects.90 
C. Practice Good Medicine, As Defined By Practice Guidelines and 
Consensus Statements 
American physicians have in recent years put forth substantial efforts 
toward standard-setting, specifying treatments for particular diseases.  Clinical 
practice guidelines (also referred to as practice parameters and clinical 
pathways) have been developed by specialty societies such as the American 
Academy of Pediatrics; by the government, through the Agency for Health 
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR); and by individual hospitals in the clinical 
setting.91  Such guidelines are sets of suggestions, described in decision rules, 
based on current medical consensus on how to treat a certain illness or 
condition.92  The Institute of Medicine has defined clinical guidelines as 
“systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 82, § 10.03. 
 88. Caldarone, supra note 20, at 141. 
 89. Id. at 142. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW 
PROGRAM (1990); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care 
Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 369–74 (1995); John Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical 
Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 421, 436–38 (1994). 
 92. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 370. 
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decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”93  
They are “standardized specifications for . . . using a procedure or for 
managing a particular clinical problem.”94 
Clinical practice guidelines, so long as they are developed by an expert 
witness, are allowed in evidence to help establish the standard of care.  They 
can also be used to impeach the opinion of an expert witness.95  A national 
standard of practice does not exist for many procedures and tools, and the 
“highest and best” practice may not be the safest or most effective in the long 
run.  Substantial regional variations exist in the use of many procedures, with 
no apparent differences in outcome (life expectancy, morbidity, days missed 
from work).96  Different practice styles exist in different regions, and even 
within states, based on a local concept of good practice.  Practices may 
continue to be used by physicians out of sheer inertia, or because 
reimbursement reinforces their use, or because it makes a physician at least 
feel like she is doing something for a patient. 
Clinical guidelines raise difficult legal questions, since they potentially 
offer an authoritative and settled statement of what the standard of care should 
be for a given treatment or illness.  A court has several choices when such 
guidelines are offered in evidence.  Such a guideline might be evidence of the 
customary practice in the medical profession.  A doctor practicing in 
conformity with a guideline would be shielded from liability to the same extent 
as one who can establish that she or he followed professional custom.  The 
guideline acts like an authoritative expert witness or a well-accepted review 
article.97  Using guidelines as evidence of professional custom, however, is 
 
 93. INST. OF MED., supra note 91, at 8. 
 94. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 370 (internal quotation omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., Roper v. Blumenfeld, 706 A.2d 1151, 1155–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998).  In Roper, the defendant used the 1992 Parameters of Care for Oral and Maxillofacial 
Surgery: A Guide of Practice, Monitoring and Evaluation in order to cross-examine the plaintiff’s 
expert and to examine his expert.  Id.  As used to impeach, it was permissible to counter 
the doctor’s opinion that because plaintiff sustained an injury during defendant’s failed 
attempt at extraction, defendant must have deviated from the standard of care because 
such injury is not a medically accepted risk of the procedures he performed.  As to this 
claim, the article is quite relevant for it lists as a known risk and complication of 
“erupted” teeth “[o]ral-facial neurologic dysfunction.” 
Id. 
 96. See generally John Wennberg & Alan Gittlesohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care 
Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973); Pamela Paul-Shaheen et al., Small Area Analysis: A Review 
and Analysis of the North American Literature, 12 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 741 (1987). 
 97. Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An 
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 289, 293–94 (1996) [hereinafter Early 
Retrospective]. 
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problematic if they are ahead of prevailing medical practice.  A guideline could 
also serve as evidence of a “respectable” minority practice.98 
Guidelines have already had an effect on settlement patterns in areas of 
litigation such as medical malpractice.99  Plaintiffs have used such guidelines 
to their advantage in malpractice cases, particularly the guidelines of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).100  Such 
guidelines provide a particularized source of standards against which to judge 
the conduct of the defendant physician.  A widely accepted clinical standard 
may be presumptive evidence of due care, but expert testimony will still be 
required to introduce the standard and establish its sources and its relevancy.  
A guideline could thus establish negligence per se or at least a rebuttable 
presumption that could then be countered with evidence.101 
Guidelines are shields to repel pressure from coaches, family, team 
management, fans, or the athlete to provide medical clearance to participate or 
treatment enabling immediate return to play.  They reduce the uncertainty of 
traditional “customary practice.”  Sports medicine consensus statements and 
guidelines have proliferated in recent years, driven in part by the publicity 
surrounding the deaths of young athletes due to underlying cardiac 
conditions.102  Such deaths have included Olympic volleyball player Flo 
 
 98. See generally id.; Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice 
Litigation: A Two-Way Street, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 450 (1995) [hereinafter Practice 
Guidelines]. 
 99. Practice Guidelines, supra note 98, at 453. 
 100. See, e.g., Miles v. Tabor, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (Mass. 1982) (finding obstetrician’s 
failure to initiate resuscitation of infant immediately after delivery violated ACOG guidelines); 
Green v. Goldberg, 630 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing ACOG bulletin on 
breast cancer treatment to support expert testimony during cross-examination or to supplement an 
opinion of the doctor which she already formed); Basten v. U.S., 848 F. Supp. 962, 967 (M.D. 
Ala. 1994) (citing ACOG guidelines requiring that alpha-fetoprotein screening be offered and that 
acceptance or rejection be documented); see also Early Retrospective, supra note 97, at 296–99. 
 101. See Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437, 448 (1988). 
 102. Barry J. Maron & Jere H. Mitchell, 26th Bethesda Conference, Introduction: Revised 
Eligibility Recommendations for Competitive Athletes with Cardiovascular Abnormalities, 24 J. 
AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 848, 848 (1994) [hereinafter 26th Bethesda Conference]; Barry J. 
Maron & Douglas P. Zipes, 36th Bethesda Conference, Introduction: Eligibility 
Recommendations for Competitive Athletes with Cardiovascular Abnormalities—General 
Considerations, 45 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 1318, 1318 (2005) [hereinafter 36th Bethesda 
Conference]; Barry J. Maron et al., Recommendations for Physical Activity and Recreational 
Sports Participation for Young Patients with Genetic Cardiovascular Diseases, 109 
CIRCULATION 2807, 2808, 2814 (2004), available at http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/reprint/109/ 
22/2807 (giving specific recommendations for physical activity and the risk factors for patients 
with genetic cardiovascular diseases and concluding that “[c]ompliance with these 
recommendations is evidence that a physician has satisfied these legal requirements and may 
form the basis of a successful defense to allegations of malpractice”); see also Team Physician 
Consensus Statement, supra note 54.  The Team Physician Consensus Statement is available on 
the websites of the following organizations: American College of Sports Medicine, 
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Hyman, basketball players Pete Maravich, Hank Gathers, and Reggie Lewis, 
Olympic gold medal figure skater Sergei Grinko and St. Louis Cardinal pitcher 
Darryl Kile.103  Hank Gathers’ collapse and death in 1992 while playing for 
Loyola-Marymount University was one of the most prominent of such 
deaths.104  Gathers’ estate alleged that his sudden death was due to 
inflammatory cardiomyopathy caused by negligent reduction of cardioactive 
medication (administered for ventricular tachyarrhythmias) to sub-therapeutic 
doses as a way to continue and advance his career.105  He was one of the best 
college players in the country and a likely early professional draft choice.106  
He insisted on progressively reducing the dosage of beta-blocker in order to 
perform at his highly skilled level, over six weeks, and his physician 
acquiesced.107  He then died during a nationally televised basketball game.108  
The suit alleged that the failure to remove him from active play in line with 
Bethesda #26 recommendations constituted negligence.109  The case was 
 
http://www.acsm.org/pdf/teamphys.pdf; American Academy of Family Physicians, 
http://www.aafp.org/x19525.xml; American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 
http://www.aaos.org/wordhtml/papers/advistmt/1021.htm; American College of Sports Medicine, 
http://www.acsm.org/pdf/teamphys.pdf; and American Orthopaedic Society for Sports Medicine, 
http://www.sportsmed.org/secure/reveal/admin/uploads/documents/CS_TeamPhysician.pdf. 
The objective of the Team Physician Consensus Statement is to provide physicians, 
school administrators, team owners, the general public, and individuals who are 
responsible for making decisions regarding the medical care of athletes and teams with 
guidelines for choosing a qualified team physician and an outline of the duties expected of 
a team physician. Ultimately, by educating decision makers about the need for a qualified 
team physician, the goal is to ensure that athletes and teams are provided the very best 
medical care. 
Team Physician Consensus Statement, supra note 54.  See generally Barry J. Maron et al., 
Competitive Athletes with Cardiovascular Disease—The Case of Nicholas Knapp, 339 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1632 (1998). 
 103. See George Vecsey, Sports of The Times: Remembering Flo Hyman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
1988, at B15; Richard Sandomir, TV Sports: The Same Pistol Pete, but Profiles Are Different, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at D3; Lawrence K. Altman, No Trace of Heart Medication in 
Gathers, Autopsy Indicates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at B9; Dave Anderson, Sports of The 
Times: Lewis Death on Celtics’ Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1993, at B7; Selina Williams, 
Figure Skating: Colleagues and Family Bid Grinkov Farewell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, § 8 
(Sports), at 8; Lawrence K. Altman, Heart Disease Can Hit Even the Young, like Kile, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2002, at D1. 
 104. See David L. Herbert, Practice Guidelines Take Center Court, 24 PHYSICIAN & 
SPORTSMED., Mar. 1996, at 81. 
 105. See Isaacs, supra note 4, at 148–49, 168–69. 
 106. See Herbert, supra note 104, at 81. 
 107. Isaacs, supra note 4, at 148–49, 168–69. 
 108. Herbert, supra note 104, at 81. 
 109. See id. 
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settled.110  It was however one of the first times that a violation of a clinical 
practice guideline was alleged in a sport injury case.111  The allegation has 
since become more common in athlete lawsuits.112  Another case, Gardner v. 
Holifield,113 involved the death of a college basketball player.  The plaintiff 
presented evidence that the physician performing the screening examination 
did not adhere to American Heart Association (AHA) screening guidelines.114 
The standard of care is defined by reference to a physician using the 
knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of 
the profession in good standing, good medical practice within the area of 
specialty practice, and reasonable, customary, accepted care under the 
circumstances.  Courts have recognized guidelines established by national 
medical associations as evidence of good medical practice, but not conclusive 
as to the standard of care. 
D. Enable Players To Avoid Unnecessary Risks: Team or Sports Policies 
Team and sport policies and guidelines that specifically address the risks of 
returning to play may help reduce pressures and temptations on all the parties.  
Many eligibility consensus statements are now available, and the deaths of 
young athletes will spur the further development of such statements.  More 
important will be the recognition by professional sports team that they risk bad 
publicity and litigation if they don’t develop policies that allow team 
physicians to decide when a player returns to play, without fear of 
repercussions.  This also requires education of athletes in the long-term risks 
such as those suffered by Krueger and others as a counterbalance to their 
understandable enthusiasm to return to play.  Consensus statements and clear 
policies for eligibility to play are a logical development in the 
professionalization of sports medicine.  Such statements will shield team 
physicians from intense pressures to keep athletes in play, and they will help 
sports develop a strong athlete-protective environment. 
 
 110. Barry J. Maron, Sudden Death in Young Athletes—Lessons from the Hank Gathers 
Affair, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 55, 55 (1993). 
 111. Herbert, supra note 104, at 81. 
 112. See, e.g., Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that national 
association medical guidelines (26th Bethesda Conference) can be used by college team 
physicians in formulating medical eligibility decisions, and upholding disqualification of an 
athlete with an implanted defibrillator); Izidor v. Knight, 117 Wash. App. 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003) (unpublished) (emphasizing the merits of adherence to American Heart Association 
screening recommendations). 
 113. 639 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 114. Id. at 653. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Sports medicine, like military medicine, exposes physicians to more 
conflicts of interest and pressures than most areas of medical practice.  The 
lure of a lucrative and celebrity-oriented medical practice has driven sports 
medicine forward into a growing specialty apace with the commercialization 
and turn to big business of professional athletics.  At the same time, new 
specialty organizations and groups have developed to guide this new specialty.  
And the courts, faced with obvious conflict situations, have in a range of cases 
set boundaries for acceptable behavior of these doctors. 
There may be other solutions that work over time to reduce conflicts: 
having physicians rotate in and out of practice with a team; having them 
employed by an independent body, such as a player’s union or professional 
sports league, rather than by the team in order to avoid immediate and direct 
conflicts; or at least having explicit agreements that define the boundaries of 
the relationship of team doctor and team more precisely than is typically done 
today.115  My suggestion is a more limited one, reflecting practices that are 
now evolving and standards that courts are proving to be comfortable 
imposing.  Practice guidelines and consensus statements guide physicians and 
also arm them with a defense against pressure to return injured players to play 
at any cost.  The POPE duties remind the sports physician that his or her 
relationship to players is a “sacred trust” that requires scrupulous attention to 
the interests of the player as the central goal of this physician–patient 
relationship. 
 
 115. See Calandrillo, supra note 18, at 203–07. 
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